The execution of the RPOPLPUSH command by the fuzzer created junk keys,
that were later being selected by RANDOMKEY and modified.
This also meant that lists were statistically tested more than other
files.
Fix the fuzzer not to pass junk key names to RPOPLPUSH, and add a check
that detects that new keys are not added by the fuzzer to detect future
similar issues.
(cherry picked from commit 3f3f678a4741e6af18230ee1862d9ced7af79faf)
The execution of the RPOPLPUSH command by the fuzzer created junk keys,
that were later being selected by RANDOMKEY and modified.
This also meant that lists were statistically tested more than other
files.
Fix the fuzzer not to pass junk key names to RPOPLPUSH, and add a check
that detects that new keys are not added by the fuzzer to detect future
similar issues.
(cherry picked from commit 3f3f678a4741e6af18230ee1862d9ced7af79faf)
This was recently broken in #9321 when we validated stream IDs to be
integers but did that after to the stepping next record instead of before.
(cherry picked from commit 5a4ab7c7d2da1773c5ed3dcfc6e367b5af03a33e)
This was recently broken in #9321 when we validated stream IDs to be
integers but did that after to the stepping next record instead of before.
(cherry picked from commit 5a4ab7c7d2da1773c5ed3dcfc6e367b5af03a33e)
Recently we found two issues in the fuzzer tester: #9302#9285
After fixing them, more problems surfaced and this PR (as well as #9297) aims to fix them.
Here's a list of the fixes
- Prevent an overflow when allocating a dict hashtable
- Prevent OOM when attempting to allocate a huge string
- Prevent a few invalid accesses in listpack
- Improve sanitization of listpack first entry
- Validate integrity of stream consumer groups PEL
- Validate integrity of stream listpack entry IDs
- Validate ziplist tail followed by extra data which start with 0xff
Co-authored-by: sundb <sundbcn@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c90370e6d71cc68e4d9cc79a0d8b1e768712a5b)
Recently we found two issues in the fuzzer tester: #9302#9285
After fixing them, more problems surfaced and this PR (as well as #9297) aims to fix them.
Here's a list of the fixes
- Prevent an overflow when allocating a dict hashtable
- Prevent OOM when attempting to allocate a huge string
- Prevent a few invalid accesses in listpack
- Improve sanitization of listpack first entry
- Validate integrity of stream consumer groups PEL
- Validate integrity of stream listpack entry IDs
- Validate ziplist tail followed by extra data which start with 0xff
Co-authored-by: sundb <sundbcn@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c90370e6d71cc68e4d9cc79a0d8b1e768712a5b)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
The redis-cli command line tool and redis-sentinel service may be vulnerable
to integer overflow when parsing specially crafted large multi-bulk network
replies. This is a result of a vulnerability in the underlying hiredis
library which does not perform an overflow check before calling the calloc()
heap allocation function.
This issue only impacts systems with heap allocators that do not perform their
own overflow checks. Most modern systems do and are therefore not likely to
be affected. Furthermore, by default redis-sentinel uses the jemalloc allocator
which is also not vulnerable.
The redis-cli command line tool and redis-sentinel service may be vulnerable
to integer overflow when parsing specially crafted large multi-bulk network
replies. This is a result of a vulnerability in the underlying hiredis
library which does not perform an overflow check before calling the calloc()
heap allocation function.
This issue only impacts systems with heap allocators that do not perform their
own overflow checks. Most modern systems do and are therefore not likely to
be affected. Furthermore, by default redis-sentinel uses the jemalloc allocator
which is also not vulnerable.
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration parameter to a very large value and constructing specially
crafted commands to manipulate sets
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration parameter to a very large value and constructing specially
crafted commands to manipulate sets
the test normally passes. but we saw one failure in a valgrind run in github actions
(cherry picked from commit 8458baf6a96fa6c6050bac24160f82d32a0b9ed4)
the test normally passes. but we saw one failure in a valgrind run in github actions
(cherry picked from commit 8458baf6a96fa6c6050bac24160f82d32a0b9ed4)
- Introduce a new sdssubstr api as a building block for sdsrange.
The API of sdsrange is many times hard to work with and also has
corner case that cause bugs. sdsrange is easy to work with and also
simplifies the implementation of sdsrange.
- Revert the fix to RM_StringTruncate and just use sdssubstr instead of
sdsrange.
- Solve valgrind warnings from the new tests introduced by the previous
PR.
(cherry picked from commit ae418eca24ba53a7dca07b0e7065f856e625469b)
- Introduce a new sdssubstr api as a building block for sdsrange.
The API of sdsrange is many times hard to work with and also has
corner case that cause bugs. sdsrange is easy to work with and also
simplifies the implementation of sdsrange.
- Revert the fix to RM_StringTruncate and just use sdssubstr instead of
sdsrange.
- Solve valgrind warnings from the new tests introduced by the previous
PR.
(cherry picked from commit ae418eca24ba53a7dca07b0e7065f856e625469b)
fixes test issue introduced in #9167
1. invalid reads due to accessing non-retained string (passed as unblock context).
2. leaking module blocked client context, see #6922 for info.
(cherry picked from commit a8518cce951629eaccde40fd0e51b36a5dc6321c)
fixes test issue introduced in #9167
1. invalid reads due to accessing non-retained string (passed as unblock context).
2. leaking module blocked client context, see #6922 for info.
(cherry picked from commit a8518cce951629eaccde40fd0e51b36a5dc6321c)
- promote the code in DEBUG PROTOCOL to addReplyBigNum
- DEBUG PROTOCOL ATTRIB skips the attribute when client is RESP2
- networking.c addReply for push and attributes generate assertion when
called on a RESP2 client, anything else would produce a broken
protocol that clients can't handle.
(cherry picked from commit 6a5bac309e868deef749c36949723b415de2496f)
- promote the code in DEBUG PROTOCOL to addReplyBigNum
- DEBUG PROTOCOL ATTRIB skips the attribute when client is RESP2
- networking.c addReply for push and attributes generate assertion when
called on a RESP2 client, anything else would produce a broken
protocol that clients can't handle.
(cherry picked from commit 6a5bac309e868deef749c36949723b415de2496f)
This makes it possible to distinguish between null response and an empty
array (currently the tests infra translates both to an empty string/list)
(cherry picked from commit 7103367ad44b4241e59a709771cb464aa2a86b20)
This makes it possible to distinguish between null response and an empty
array (currently the tests infra translates both to an empty string/list)
(cherry picked from commit 7103367ad44b4241e59a709771cb464aa2a86b20)
The `Tracking gets notification of expired keys` test in tracking.tcl
used to hung in valgrind CI quite a lot.
It turns out the reason is that with valgrind and a busy machine, the
server cron active expire cycle could easily run in the same event loop
as the command that created `mykey`, so that when they key got expired,
there were two change events to broadcast, one that set the key and one
that expired it, but since we used raxTryInsert, the client that was
associated with the "last" change was the one that created the key, so
the NOLOOP filtered that event.
This commit adds a test that reproduces the problem by using lazy expire
in a multi-exec which makes sure the key expires in the same event loop
as the one that added it.
(cherry picked from commit 9b564b525d8ce88295ec14ffdc3bede7e5f5c33e)
The `Tracking gets notification of expired keys` test in tracking.tcl
used to hung in valgrind CI quite a lot.
It turns out the reason is that with valgrind and a busy machine, the
server cron active expire cycle could easily run in the same event loop
as the command that created `mykey`, so that when they key got expired,
there were two change events to broadcast, one that set the key and one
that expired it, but since we used raxTryInsert, the client that was
associated with the "last" change was the one that created the key, so
the NOLOOP filtered that event.
This commit adds a test that reproduces the problem by using lazy expire
in a multi-exec which makes sure the key expires in the same event loop
as the one that added it.
(cherry picked from commit 9b564b525d8ce88295ec14ffdc3bede7e5f5c33e)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the
STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.
(cherry picked from commit 1ddecf1958924b178b76a31d989ef1e05af81964)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the
STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.
(cherry picked from commit 1ddecf1958924b178b76a31d989ef1e05af81964)
When estimating the effort for unlink, we try to compute the effort of
the first group and extrapolate.
If there's a groups rax that's empty, there'a an assertion.
reproduce:
xadd s * a b
xgroup create s bla $
xgroup destroy s bla
unlink s
(cherry picked from commit 97108845e2ae7661e5091c817cb03459ec81ea8c)
When estimating the effort for unlink, we try to compute the effort of
the first group and extrapolate.
If there's a groups rax that's empty, there'a an assertion.
reproduce:
xadd s * a b
xgroup create s bla $
xgroup destroy s bla
unlink s
(cherry picked from commit 97108845e2ae7661e5091c817cb03459ec81ea8c)
Redis Enterprise supports the CONFIG GET command, but it replies with am
empty array since the save and appendonly configs are not supported.
before this fix redis-benchmark would segfault for trying to access the
error string on an array type reply.
see #8869
(cherry picked from commit 4d1094e8be3150b92b3e96d3a743c66b1a95988a)
Redis Enterprise supports the CONFIG GET command, but it replies with am
empty array since the save and appendonly configs are not supported.
before this fix redis-benchmark would segfault for trying to access the
error string on an array type reply.
see #8869
(cherry picked from commit 4d1094e8be3150b92b3e96d3a743c66b1a95988a)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.
(cherry picked from commit f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.
(cherry picked from commit f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9)
An integer overflow bug in Redis 6.2 could be exploited to corrupt the heap and
potentially result with remote code execution.
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration value, creating a large set key that consists of integer values
and using the COPY command to duplicate it.
The integer overflow bug exists in all versions of Redis starting with 2.6,
where it could result with a corrupted RDB or DUMP payload, but not exploited
through COPY (which did not exist before 6.2).
(cherry picked from commit 29900d4e6bccdf3691bedf0ea9a5d84863fa3592)
An integer overflow bug in Redis 6.2 could be exploited to corrupt the heap and
potentially result with remote code execution.
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration value, creating a large set key that consists of integer values
and using the COPY command to duplicate it.
The integer overflow bug exists in all versions of Redis starting with 2.6,
where it could result with a corrupted RDB or DUMP payload, but not exploited
through COPY (which did not exist before 6.2).
(cherry picked from commit 29900d4e6bccdf3691bedf0ea9a5d84863fa3592)
This solves an issue reported in #8712 in which a replica would bypass
the client write pause check and cause an assertion due to executing a
write command during failover.
The fact is that we don't expect replicas to execute any command other
than maybe REPLCONF and PING, etc. but matching against the ADMIN
command flag is insufficient, so instead i just block keyspace access
for now.
(cherry picked from commit 46f4ebbe842620f0976a36741a72482620aa4b48)
This solves an issue reported in #8712 in which a replica would bypass
the client write pause check and cause an assertion due to executing a
write command during failover.
The fact is that we don't expect replicas to execute any command other
than maybe REPLCONF and PING, etc. but matching against the ADMIN
command flag is insufficient, so instead i just block keyspace access
for now.
(cherry picked from commit 46f4ebbe842620f0976a36741a72482620aa4b48)
In github actions CI with valgrind, i saw that even the fast replica
(one that wasn't paused), didn't get to complete the replication fast
enough, and ended up getting disconnected by timeout.
Additionally, due to a typo in uname, we didn't get to actually run the
CPU efficiency part of the test.
In github actions CI with valgrind, i saw that even the fast replica
(one that wasn't paused), didn't get to complete the replication fast
enough, and ended up getting disconnected by timeout.
Additionally, due to a typo in uname, we didn't get to actually run the
CPU efficiency part of the test.
1. the `dump_logs` option would have printed only logs of servers that were
spawn before the test proc started, and not ones that the test proc
started inside it.
2. when a server proc catches an exception it should normally forward the
exception upwards, specifically when it's an assertion that should be
caught by a test proc above. however, in `durable` mode, we caught all
exceptions printed them to stdout and let the code continue,
this was wrong to do for assertions, which should have still been
propagated to the test function.
3. don't bother to search for crash log to print if we printed the the
entire log anyway
4. if no crash log was found, no need to print anything (i.e. the fact it
wasn't found)
5. rename warnings_from_file to crashlog_from_file
1. the `dump_logs` option would have printed only logs of servers that were
spawn before the test proc started, and not ones that the test proc
started inside it.
2. when a server proc catches an exception it should normally forward the
exception upwards, specifically when it's an assertion that should be
caught by a test proc above. however, in `durable` mode, we caught all
exceptions printed them to stdout and let the code continue,
this was wrong to do for assertions, which should have still been
propagated to the test function.
3. don't bother to search for crash log to print if we printed the the
entire log anyway
4. if no crash log was found, no need to print anything (i.e. the fact it
wasn't found)
5. rename warnings_from_file to crashlog_from_file
server.client_pause_end_time is uninitialized, or actually 0, at startup,
which means this method would think the timeout was reached
and go look for paused clients.
This causes no harm since unpauseClients will not find any paused clients.
server.client_pause_end_time is uninitialized, or actually 0, at startup,
which means this method would think the timeout was reached
and go look for paused clients.
This causes no harm since unpauseClients will not find any paused clients.
The code used to decide on the next time to wake on a timer with
microsecond accuracy, but when deciding to go to sleep it used
milliseconds accuracy (with truncation), this means that it would wake
up too early, see that there's no timer to process, and go to sleep
again for 0ms again and again until the right microsecond arrived.
i.e. a timer for 100ms, would sleep for 99ms, but then do a busy loop
through the kernel in the last millisecond, triggering many calls to
beforeSleep.
The fix is to change all the logic in ae.c to work with microseconds,
which is good since most of the ae backends support micro (or even nano)
seconds. however the epoll backend, doesn't support micro, so to avoid
this problem it needs to round upwards, rather than truncate.
Issue created by the monotonic timer PR #7644 (redis 6.2)
Before that, all the timers in ae.c were in milliseconds (using
mstime), so when it requested the backend to sleep till the next timer
event, it would have worked ok.
The code used to decide on the next time to wake on a timer with
microsecond accuracy, but when deciding to go to sleep it used
milliseconds accuracy (with truncation), this means that it would wake
up too early, see that there's no timer to process, and go to sleep
again for 0ms again and again until the right microsecond arrived.
i.e. a timer for 100ms, would sleep for 99ms, but then do a busy loop
through the kernel in the last millisecond, triggering many calls to
beforeSleep.
The fix is to change all the logic in ae.c to work with microseconds,
which is good since most of the ae backends support micro (or even nano)
seconds. however the epoll backend, doesn't support micro, so to avoid
this problem it needs to round upwards, rather than truncate.
Issue created by the monotonic timer PR #7644 (redis 6.2)
Before that, all the timers in ae.c were in milliseconds (using
mstime), so when it requested the backend to sleep till the next timer
event, it would have worked ok.
371d7f120 added a change that configures the tcp (plaintext) port
alongside the tls port, this causes the INFO command for tcp_port
to return that instead of the tls port when running in tls, and that broke
the sentinel tests that query it.
the fix is to add a method that gets the right port from CONFIG instead
of relying on the tcp_port info field.
5629dbe71 added a change that configures the tcp (plaintext) port
alongside the tls port, this causes the INFO command for tcp_port
to return that instead of the tls port when running in tls, and that broke
the sentinel tests that query it.
the fix is to add a method that gets the right port from CONFIG instead
of relying on the tcp_port info field.
Another test race condition in the macos tests.
the test was waiting for PINGs to be generated and put on the replication stream,
but waiting for 1 or 2 seconds doesn't really guarantee that.
then the test that expected 6 full syncs, found only 4
Another test race condition in the macos tests.
the test was waiting for PINGs to be generated and put on the replication stream,
but waiting for 1 or 2 seconds doesn't really guarantee that.
then the test that expected 6 full syncs, found only 4
* SLOWLOG didn't record anything for blocked commands because the client
was reset and argv was already empty. there was a fix for this issue
specifically for modules, now it works for all blocked clients.
* The original command argv (before being re-written) was also reset
before adding the slowlog on behalf of the blocked command.
* Latency monitor is now updated regardless of the slowlog flags of the
command or its execution (their purpose is to hide sensitive info from
the slowlog, not hide the fact the latency happened).
* Latency monitor now uses real_cmd rather than c->cmd (which may be
different if the command got re-written, e.g. GEOADD)
Changes:
* Unify shared code between slowlog insertion in call() and
updateStatsOnUnblock(), hopefully prevent future bugs from happening
due to the later being overlooked.
* Reset CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING in resetClient rather than after command
processing.
* Add a test for SLOWLOG and BLPOP
Notes:
- real_cmd == c->lastcmd, except inside MULTI and Lua.
- blocked commands never happen in these cases (MULTI / Lua)
- real_cmd == c->cmd, except for when the command is rewritten (e.g.
GEOADD)
- blocked commands (currently) are never rewritten
- other than the command's CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING, and the
execution flag CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING, other cases that we want to
avoid slowlog are on AOF loading (specifically CMD_CALL_SLOWLOG will
be off when executed from execCommand that runs from an AOF)
* SLOWLOG didn't record anything for blocked commands because the client
was reset and argv was already empty. there was a fix for this issue
specifically for modules, now it works for all blocked clients.
* The original command argv (before being re-written) was also reset
before adding the slowlog on behalf of the blocked command.
* Latency monitor is now updated regardless of the slowlog flags of the
command or its execution (their purpose is to hide sensitive info from
the slowlog, not hide the fact the latency happened).
* Latency monitor now uses real_cmd rather than c->cmd (which may be
different if the command got re-written, e.g. GEOADD)
Changes:
* Unify shared code between slowlog insertion in call() and
updateStatsOnUnblock(), hopefully prevent future bugs from happening
due to the later being overlooked.
* Reset CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING in resetClient rather than after command
processing.
* Add a test for SLOWLOG and BLPOP
Notes:
- real_cmd == c->lastcmd, except inside MULTI and Lua.
- blocked commands never happen in these cases (MULTI / Lua)
- real_cmd == c->cmd, except for when the command is rewritten (e.g.
GEOADD)
- blocked commands (currently) are never rewritten
- other than the command's CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING, and the
execution flag CLIENT_PREVENT_LOGGING, other cases that we want to
avoid slowlog are on AOF loading (specifically CMD_CALL_SLOWLOG will
be off when executed from execCommand that runs from an AOF)
the corrupt-dump-fuzzer test found a case where an access to a corrupt
stream would have caused accessing to uninitialized memory.
now it'll panic instead.
The issue was that there was a stream that says it has more than 0
records, but looking for the max ID came back empty handed.
p.s. when sanitize-dump-payload is used, this corruption is detected,
and the RESTORE command is gracefully rejected.
the corrupt-dump-fuzzer test found a case where an access to a corrupt
stream would have caused accessing to uninitialized memory.
now it'll panic instead.
The issue was that there was a stream that says it has more than 0
records, but looking for the max ID came back empty handed.
p.s. when sanitize-dump-payload is used, this corruption is detected,
and the RESTORE command is gracefully rejected.
We sometimes see the crash report saying we were killed by a random
process even in cases where the crash was spontanius in redis.
for instance, crashes found by the corrupt-dump test.
It looks like this si_pid is sometimes left uninitialized, and a good
way to tell if the crash originated in redis or trigged by outside is to
look at si_code, real signal codes are always > 0, and ones generated by
kill are have si_code of 0 or below.
We sometimes see the crash report saying we were killed by a random
process even in cases where the crash was spontanius in redis.
for instance, crashes found by the corrupt-dump test.
It looks like this si_pid is sometimes left uninitialized, and a good
way to tell if the crash originated in redis or trigged by outside is to
look at si_code, real signal codes are always > 0, and ones generated by
kill are have si_code of 0 or below.
Since redis 6.2, redis immediately tries to connect to the master, not
waiting for replication cron.
in the slow freebsd CI, this test failed and master_link_status was
already "up" when INFO was called.
Since redis 6.2, redis immediately tries to connect to the master, not
waiting for replication cron.
in the slow freebsd CI, this test failed and master_link_status was
already "up" when INFO was called.
REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_EVICT and REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_MAXMEMORY
shouldn't be set when the module is run inside a replica that doesn't do eviction.
one may argue that the database is under eviction (the master does eviction and sends DELs to the replica).
but on the other hand, we don't really know the master's configuration.
all that matters is if the current instance does evictions or not.
REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_EVICT and REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_MAXMEMORY
shouldn't be set when the module is run inside a replica that doesn't do eviction.
one may argue that the database is under eviction (the master does eviction and sends DELs to the replica).
but on the other hand, we don't really know the master's configuration.
all that matters is if the current instance does evictions or not.
`master_sync_perc` and `loading_loaded_perc` don't have that sign,
and i think the info field should be a raw floating point number (the name suggests its units).
we already have `used_memory_peak_perc` and `used_memory_dataset_perc` which do add the `%` sign, but:
1) i think it was a mistake but maybe too late to fix now, and maybe not too late to fix for `current_fork_perc`
2) it is more important to be consistent with the two other "progress" "prec" metrics, and not with the "utilization" metric.
`master_sync_perc` and `loading_loaded_perc` don't have that sign,
and i think the info field should be a raw floating point number (the name suggests its units).
we already have `used_memory_peak_perc` and `used_memory_dataset_perc` which do add the `%` sign, but:
1) i think it was a mistake but maybe too late to fix now, and maybe not too late to fix for `current_fork_perc`
2) it is more important to be consistent with the two other "progress" "prec" metrics, and not with the "utilization" metric.
Oran Agra