- Avatar localization redirect SSRF: fetch avatars via fetchSafe (DNS-pinned,
redirects rejected) instead of native redirect:follow, and validate
profile.avatarUrl scheme (http/https/data:image/local) at write time.
- Trello import source.url stored XSS: only render/store an http(s) activity
source URL, so a javascript: board url can no longer execute on click.
- Trello LIVE import readable SSRF: gate every attachment/background/avatar
download with validateAttachmentUrl, matching the offline import path.
- CAS login global user-data race: store validated CAS user data per credential
token instead of a module-global _userData (fixes account-takeover race).
- Metrics X-Forwarded-For whitelist bypass: only trust XFF behind
METRICS_TRUST_PROXY (parsed spoof-resistantly from the right); else use the
socket peer address.
- Stale impersonation export bypass: remove the "|| impersonateDone" export
authorization bypass; require real board visibility (canExport) only.
- Invitation code brute force: generate invitation codes with a 128-bit CSPRNG
(crypto.randomBytes) instead of a 6-digit Math.random value, and rate-limit
createUser (DDPRateLimiter).
The OIDC shared serviceData race from the same report was already fixed (#4897,
the per-login objects are callout-local). Source-guard regression test added
(tests/securityMeifukun.test.cjs) and wired into test:unit:node.
Thanks to meifukun and xet7 !
`POST /api/createtoken/:userId`](https://github.com/wekan/wekan/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
(CWE-863, CWE-287). `Authentication.checkUserId` in `server/authentication.js` is an
`async` function, so its 401 (undefined `userId`) and 403 (not an admin) throws become
rejected promises rather than synchronous exceptions. The REST handlers in
`server/models/users.js` and `server/models/boards.js` called it without `await` inside a
plain synchronous `try/catch`, which cannot catch a rejected promise, so the failed check
never stopped execution. `POST /api/createtoken/:userId` then went on to mint and return a
usable login token for any user ID in the URL — including an admin — with no credentials at
all (unauthenticated account takeover). The same detached-rejection bypass also affected
`GET /api/users`, `GET /api/users/:userId`, `PUT /api/users/:userId`, `POST /api/users/`,
`DELETE /api/users/:userId`, `POST /api/deletetoken`, `GET /api/boards`,
`GET /api/boards_count`, `DELETE /api/boards/:boardId`, `GET /api/users/:userId/boards` and
`POST /api/boards/:boardId/copy`. Fixed by awaiting every async `Authentication` check (and
making the two non-`async` handlers `async`) so a failed check rejects before any privileged
code runs. The same un-awaited pattern in the board/card/Excel/PDF export handlers
(`models/export.js`, `models/exportExcel.js`, `models/exportExcelCard.js`, `models/exportPDF.js`,
which were backstopped by `exporter.canExport()`) and in the checklist-create handler
(`server/models/checklists.js`) was given the same await pass. Affected Wekan v9.35 and earlier.
Thanks to Zion Boggan, xet7 and Claude.
Lauri Ojansivu
Harry Adel
Martin Filser
Jan Dvorak
Jan Küster